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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Dataset Evaluation for Data Trading Using Expected Loss and Homomorphic Encryption
by
Minsung (Michael) Joo
Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics and Computer Science
Washington University in St. Louis, April 2022
Research Advisor: Professor Netanel Raviv

Supervised machine learning suffers from the “garbage-in garbage-out” phenomenon where
the performance of a model is limited by the quality of the data. While a myriad of data
is collected every second, there is no general rigorous method of evaluating the quality of
a given dataset. This hinders fair pricing of data in scenarios where a buyer may look
to buy data for use with machine learning. In this work, I propose using the expected
loss corresponding to a dataset as a measure of its quality, relying on Bayesian methods
for uncertainty quantification. Furthermore, I present a secure multi-party computation
protocol with homomorphic encryption, assuming semi-honest parties, for computation of
the expected loss between the buyer and the seller without compromising the data. With
experimental results, I show the promise of this approach and also current limitations in
real-life feasibility.

vii

Chapter 1
Introduction
Machine learning tries to solve a problem by finding patterns in data that describe the
problem (Bishop, 2006). Given the data, the performance of machine learning relies on how
accurately we find patterns and how generalizable the estimated patterns are. Therefore,
machine learning can succeed only if there is a valid pattern to be found in the data and
if that pattern is generalizable to the problem outside the data. In other words, machine
learning is only as good as the data it is given, a phenomenon referred to as “garbage-in
garbage-out”.
Then for one to leverage the wonders that machine learning is said to provide, one must
first have informative data about their problem. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done.
With a myriad of data collected every second, the problem of finding the right data becomes
a daunting challenge. While simply having more data is both theoretically and empirically
an answer, the cost of collecting and processing meaningful data is not insignificant. This
has led to advancements in the field of active learning and semi-supervised learning that try
to answer where we might try to get more data to efficiently learn more about the problem
(Settles, 2009; Zhu, 2005).
In this work, I focus less on where to collect more data and instead try to answer how
to evaluate and compare different datasets, a problem previously addressed by Raviv et
al. (2021). Furthermore, I apply this to a real-life scenario of data trading. Consider the
following scenario: assume a buyer wishes to solve a problem with machine learning, but
does not have access to relevant good quality data nor a means to collect them. Then, the
buyer must buy the data from an outside source, who may not be willing to share their data
for free since a considerable amount of cost went into collecting them. How will the buyer
1

know which seller to buy data from and whether the buyer is paying a fair price considering
other sellers and the marginal benefits the purchase will give to the buyer? Furthermore,
how do sellers prove to the buyer that their data is better than others’, without revealing
their data, and thus compromising the very product they are trying to sell?
I propose using the expected loss of a dataset D = {(xi , yi )}ni=1 , as its measure of value,
where x is the vector of features from the domain of the problem and y is the corresponding
latent variable or label that we wish to predict. Expected loss is generally used in relation
to models or hypotheses. Instead, I define the expected loss of a dataset as the expected
loss corresponding to the posterior distribution p(y | x, D) induced by the dataset. The
expectation is taken with respect to the domain distribution of x of the problem. The
loss function is provided by the buyer, so that it suits the buyer’s situation and allows
for comparison with their marginal benefits. In this work, I focus on datasets of binary
classification problems, where the label y ∈ {±1} or {0, 1}. However, I believe my work
may be easily applied to other supervised machine learning problems, such as regression.
Furthermore, I assume the data to be processed and do not consider “tidyness” of the data
in measuring quality.
Addressing the problem of comparing sellers’ datasets without compromising them, I present
a secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol using homomorphic encryption (HE)
(Canetti et al., 1996; Rivest, 1978). The protocol involves three parties: the buyer, the
seller, and an untrusted 3rd party (U3P). By keeping the encryption phase of the data
within their owners and the computation of the expected loss within the U3P who has no
access to decrypted data, my protocol keeps the data safe during evaluation. Here, I assume
semi-honest parties, where an adversary may try to extract as much information as they can,
beyond the intended amount, but follow the protocol honestly (Goldreich et al., 1987).
I begin this work in chapter 2 by formally defining the expected loss of a dataset and justifying
its use as a measure of data quality. I use commonly used loss functions, but leave the
definition open so that any reasonable loss function may be used. Then, in chapter 3, I explain
implementation details in computing the expected loss, focusing on challenges that different
data patterns present in terms of model structure uncertainty and parameter uncertainty.
As a remedy, I turn to Bayesian model averaging (BMA) and Bayesian inference of model
parameters and justify using them over other viable options. In chapter 4, I introduce HE,
2

the scheme I choose, and describe my full MPC protocol of dataset evaluation. I continue
in chapter 5 by presenting experimental results on synthetic data and real-life data, using
various loss functions to demonstrate the flexibility of using expected loss as a measure of
data quality. Finally, I conclude this work by presenting the current limitations of this work
in real-life feasibility. I also propose research questions that, once solved, would greatly
improve both the performance and efficiency of my proposed protocol.

3

Chapter 2
Expected Loss
The idea of using expected loss for evaluating and comparing datasets is almost natural.
Indeed it is how we often choose between different machine learning algorithms. For example,
cross validation loss measured on an out-of-sample validation set can be seen as, albeit a
crude one, a Monte Carlo approximation to the expected loss where we assume the problem
and validation set to be generated by the same distribution. Using cross validation to choose
a model and adjust hyperparameters is common practice in machine learning pipelines. We
may simply extend this use for comparing different datasets and choose the dataset that
most reduces the expected loss on the classification problem.
In this section, I first formally define the expected loss corresponding to a given dataset.
Then, I look at how the expected loss of a dataset is proportional to the variance of valid
hypotheses given the dataset. This part builds on previous work on data value estimation
that uses the expected diameter of the space of possible linear classifiers, relating how the
two are mathematically equivalent (Raviv et al., 2021). Third, I look at how minimizing
the expected loss could be related to minimizing the conditional entropy of the label of
points in the domain. Finally, while the idea of using expected loss to evaluate datasets
is intuitively natural, it remains to see why and how a dataset with a low expected loss is
valuable. Therefore, I justify the use of expected loss, presenting a scenario that this work
tries to solve.

4

2.1

Definition

We first look at the expected loss of an individual hypothesis h : X → Y which we treat as
a function whose input is a data point in the domain and the output is the predicted label
or some relevant value. Let ℓ : Y × Y → R, ℓ(ŷ, y) be the loss of an individual prediction
ŷ when the true label is y. Throughout this work I use p(x, y) to mean the probability
density function p(X = x, Y = y) where X, Y are random variables corresponding to the
feature vector, or input, and the label, while x, y are their realizations. Furthermore, I
use P(y) := P(Y = y) to denote explicit probabilities, especially for Y , a discrete random
variable. Then, we have:
Z
L[h] :=

ℓ(h(x), y)p(x, y) dxdy

(2.1.1)

X ×Y

Defining Y = {0, 1} for binary classification problems, we have the following:
Z
L[h] =


ℓ(h(x), y = 1)p(x, Y = 1) + ℓ(h(x), Y = 0)p(x, Y = 0) dx

ZX


ℓ(h(x), y = 1)P(y = 1 | x) + ℓ(h(x), y = 0)P(y = 0 | x) p(x)dx
X


= Ex ℓ(h(x), y = 1)P(y = 1 | x) + ℓ(h(x), y = 0)P(y = 0 | x)

=

(2.1.2)

Now it remains to see how we may relate L[h] to a dataset D = {X, y}. Notice that upon a
Bayesian treatment, a hypothesis may be seen as some function of the posterior distribution
over the latent variable given an input and the dataset. Formally, for any problem, regardless
of regression or classification, we may define:
h(x) := ϕ(P(y | x, D))

(2.1.3)

for some function ϕ that would depend on how we define a prediction and the corresponding
loss ℓ. Then, observe how h(x) is a function of D. One final note is that we must account
for how observing D changes the joint distribution p(x, y). Now, we may simply extend the
definition in (2.2) to be a function of D as such:

5

Definition 2.1.1 (Expected Loss of a Dataset). The expected loss of a dataset D is the
expected loss of the hypothesis induced by the posterior distribution of the latent variable
given an input, that is in turn induced by the dataset. Denoted L(D), we have:
Z
ℓ(ϕ(P(y | x, D)), y)p(x, y) dxdy

L(D) :=
X ×Y

where ϕ is a given function that maps the posterior distribution to a desired prediction and
ℓ is a given loss function.
For binary classification problems, we have:

L(D) = Ex ℓ(ϕ(P(y | x, D)), y = 1)P(y = 1 | x, D)

+ ℓ(ϕ(P(y | x, D)), y = 0)P(y = 0 | x, D)

(2.1.4)

For binary classification problems, we have two common configurations for ϕ and ℓ, and
another configuration that is not commonly used but relevant to this work. Notice that for
all loss functions, we define ϕ such that h returns the optimal prediction that minimizes ℓ.
For simplicity, let π(x) = P(y = 1 | x, D). First is the case of using 0-1 loss upon explicit
prediction of labels. In this case, for some threshold value ρ ∈ [0, 1], we have:
h0 (x) = ϕ0 (π(x)) := 1[π(x) ≥ ρ]
ℓ0 (ŷ, y) = 1[ŷ ̸= y]

Second is the case of using log loss upon predicting the probability of each possible label. In
this case, we have:
he (x) = ϕe (π(x)) := π(x)
ℓe (ŷ, y) = −y log ŷ − (1 − y) log(1 − ŷ)

6

Here, we look at how using the log loss translates to the expected loss of a dataset.


L(D) = Ex ℓe (π(x), 1)P(y = 1 | x, D) + ℓe (π(x), y = 0)P(y = 0 | x, D)


= −Ex (log π(x))π(x) + (log(1 − π(x)))(1 − π(x))


= −Ex π(x) log π(x) + (1 − π(x)) log(1 − π(x))

(2.1.5)

The third rare case is using ℓ2 loss upon predicting the probability of each possible label. In
this case, we have:
h2 (x) = ϕ2 (π(x)) := π(x)
ℓ2 (ŷ, y) = (y − ŷ)2
Notice again that our prediction h2 (x) is the optimal prediction that minimizes ℓ2 . Here, we
look at how using the ℓ2 loss translates to the expected loss of a dataset.


L(D) = Ex ℓ2 (π(x), 1)P(y = 1 | x, D) + ℓ2 (π(x), y = 0)P(y = 0 | x, D)


= Ex (1 − π(x))2 π(x) + (0 − π(x))2 (1 − π(x))


= Ex (1 − π(x))π(x) (1 − π(x)) + π(x)


= Ex (1 − π(x))π(x)

(2.1.6)

Notice here that assuming some random variable A to have a Bernoulli distribution with parameter P(A = 1) = π(x) gives us that L(D) is the expected variance of A, with expectation
taken with respect to x:
L(D) = Ex Var(A)
(2.1.7)
This will be used later when showing how the idea of the expected diameter in Raviv et al.
(2021) is equivalent to the variance of hypotheses induced by the dataset, and consequently,
the expected loss of the dataset.
While the above are a few of the most widely used loss functions, note that there is no limit
to how ℓ may be configured. This allows for any loss function for any situation to be applied
in computing the expected loss.

7

2.2

Variance of Hypotheses

In a similar work, Raviv et al. (2021) measure the value of a dataset according to the expected
diameter defined as such:
Definition 2.2.1 (Expected Diameter). For a given dataset D and a given probability distribution H over its set of consistent hypotheses, the expected diameter of D is Eh1 ,h2 ∼H d(h1 , h2 ),
where d(h1 , h2 ) is defined as the fraction of x’s on which h1 and h2 disagree.
Here, set H is defined as the set of valid hypotheses under D, equipped with a probability
distribution over the hypotheses. In other words, if we think of the domain as a linearly
separable space according to the associated labels, H is the set (and distribution) of hyperplanes that separate the domain in accordance with the points in D. Here, each hypothesis
h ∈ H simply predicts the label associated with a point x. Raviv et al. (2021) claim that a
dataset with a lower expected diameter is more valuable as it means that the dataset eliminates more possible hyperplanes. In other words, a dataset with a lower expected diameter
carries more information about where the true label-generating hyperplane lies. Taking a
Bayesian approach, we may claim that H is the posterior distribution over the set of possible
hyperplanes induced by D.
While Raviv et al. (2021) focuses on binary domains where x ∈ {±1}n , we may easily
extend it for continuous domains. Let D(D) denote the expected diameter of a dataset D
and H(x) = Eh h(x). Switching to Y = {±1} labels for simplicity, we observe the following
from Raviv et al. (2021):
D(D) = Eh1 ,h2 d(h1 , h2 )


1 − h1 (x)h2 (x)
= Eh1 ,h2 Ex
2


1 − h(x)H(x)
= Ex Eh
2


1 − H(x)2
= Ex
2

8

(2.2.1)

Furthermore, ∀x ∈ X , if we look at the variance of the hypothesis h ∼ H, we have:
Varh (h(x)) = Eh [(h(x) − H(x))2 ]
= Eh [h(x)2 − 2h(x)H(x) + H(x)2 ]
= 1 − 2H(x)2 + H(x)2
= 1 − H(x)2

(2.2.2)

Therefore, using (2.2.1) and (2.2.2), we have:
1
D(D) = Ex Varh (h(x))
2

(2.2.3)

In other words, the expected diameter of a dataset is proportional to the expected variance
of the hypothesis, which is also the expected ℓ2 loss between a hypothesis and the expected
hypothesis.
Now, we show the following:
Theorem 2.2.1. The expected ℓ2 loss of a dataset is proportional to the expected diameter
of a dataset.
Proof. Notice that since h ∼ H, as used by Raviv et al. (2021), where H is the posterior
distribution over the set of valid hypotheses induced by D, for a given point x, we have:
P(h(x) = 1) = P(y = 1 | x, D) =: π(x)
Then, since h(x) ∈ {±1} we have that h(x) is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter
π(x). Therefore, by (2.1.7) and (2.2.3):
L(D) = Ex Varh (h(x))
∝ D(D)

9

(2.2.4)

The above theorem shows that the expected ℓ2 loss is proportional to the expected diameter
of the dataset, where both are equivalent to the expected variance of hypotheses induced
by the dataset. Therefore, we may conclude that a dataset with lower expected diameter
and lower expected ℓ2 loss will induce a posterior distribution over possible hypotheses with
lower variance. With lower variance, we may conclude that such a dataset will have greater
confidence over where the true label-generating hyperplane lies.

2.3

Expected Loss and Information Gain

The information gain is defined as the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the prior distribution
from the posterior distribution. Using this definition for our problem, for a given point x,
we have:
IG(y | x, D) = DKL (P(y | x, D) || P(y | x))
= H(y | x) − H(y | x, D)

(2.3.1)

where H is the information entropy of a random variable. Since the entropy of a random
variable measures how much randomness or surprise there is in the random variable’s outcome, it makes sense that a valuable dataset that is informative should significantly reduce
the entropy. Therefore, we may claim that a dataset that leads to more expected information
gain over x ∼ X for the random variable y | x is also more valuable.
Now, we show the following:
Theorem 2.3.1. Given datasets Di , i = 1, · · · , n, the dataset that minimizes the expected
log loss is the dataset that maximizes the expected information gain of y | x given D, with
expectation taken over x.
Proof. Notice that each Di does not affect P(y | x). Then, let C := Ex H(y | x) a constant
that depends on the prior distribution of y | x and x. Also let πi (x) = P(y = 1 | x, Di ).

10

Then, by (2.1.5) and (2.3.1) we have:


arg min L(Di ) = arg min −Ex πi (x) log πi (x) + (1 − πi (x)) log(1 − πi (x))
i
i


= arg max Ex πi (x) log πi (x) + (1 − πi (x)) log(1 − πi (x))
i


= arg max C + Ex πi (x) log πi (x) + (1 − πi (x)) log(1 − πi (x))
i

= arg max Ex H(y | x) − Ex H(y | x, Di )
i

= arg max Ex IG(y | x, Di )

(2.3.2)

i

2.4

Expected Loss as a Measure of Value

Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 both justify using expected loss to evaluate the value of a dataset.
Theorem 2.1 shows how comparing datasets according to the expected diameter idea used
in Raviv et al. (2021) is equivalent to using the expected ℓ2 loss. Theorem 2.2 shows how
comparing datasets according to their respective expected information gain of the latent
variables associated with points in the domain is equivalent to using the expected log loss.
Therefore, besides the natural argument of stating that minimizing expected loss is desirable,
we have that a dataset with lower expected loss is valuable because of how it has lower
expected diameter and higher information gain.
Another advantage of using expected loss is its applicability to different situations. First.
consider the case when the buyer has their own data and a corresponding hypothesis and are
looking to augment it by buying more data. In this case, we may slightly alter the problem
as such. Instead of simply choosing the dataset with lowest expected loss, we choose the
dataset with lowest expected loss once augmented onto the buyer’s existing data:
D∗ = arg max L(Db ) − L(Db ∪ Di ) = arg min L(Db ∪ Di )
i

(2.4.1)

i

where Db is the buyer’s existing dataset. An additional advantage of expected loss in this
scenario is that a buyer may discover that all options do not significantly decrease expected
11

loss, and therefore they choose not to invest in augmenting their data. This allows for a
reasoned purchase decision in buying data.
Another case where using expected loss is advantageous is when the data buyer has a specific
loss function that meets their needs, as previously mentioned in section 2.1. For example,
consider a medical diagnostic of a viral disease, where the loss of making a type II error (false
negative) is much higher than that of making a type I error (false positive). In this case, a
buyer may configure a loss function that heavily penalizes type II errors to evaluate datasets.
Furthermore, this allows for a buyer to configure a loss function so that they can immediately
compare the expected monetary gain from buying the dataset and make purchase decisions
accordingly. These two cases will be further investigated with implemented examples in
Chapter 5.
Finally, we look at another significance of expected loss and what a dataset with low expected
loss actually implies. To do so, let us compare what the ideal dataset looks like and what a
useless dataset looks like. Note that for both the ℓ2 and log loss functions, simply taking the
derivative shows that the expected loss decreases as each π(x) gets closer to 0 or 1. On the
other hand, expected loss increases as each π(x) gets closer to 0.5. Then, we see that the
expected loss in this case relies on how confident we are in our predictions. This, however,
presents the problem that an adversarial dataset whose corresponding posterior distribution
leads to all points being predicted to have label y = +1 with probability 1 may be judged
to be ideal, which is why we assume that we work under semi-honest adversaries that follow
the protocol honestly. In real-life cases, we could easily filter out malicious adversaries who
do not follow protocol with a small amount of validation data.

12

Chapter 3
Different Data Patterns
The justification for using expected loss as a measure of the value of a dataset depends on the
assumption that the posterior distribution p(y | x, D) is reliable. This depends on the choice
of the model prior and model evidence, more so on the latter. Our choice of model evidence
is determined by how we model the relationship between x and its corresponding latent
variable y. This decision heavily influences the outlook we have on candidate datasets, where
modeling the relationship in the wrong way could lead to a comparatively uninformative
dataset being valued more than an informative one. In this section, I demonstrate such a
phenomenon and discuss non-parametric modeling and Bayesian model averaging (BMA) as
remedies to this problem. This addresses the problem of model uncertainty. Furthermore, I
discuss maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and maximum a posteriori (MAP) methods
in parametric modeling of the model evidence and how such point estimation methods could
fail to differentiate datasets of varying value, unlike Bayesian inference. This addresses the
problem of parameter uncertainty. Recall in the previous chapter that the significance of
expected loss lies in how a dataset reduces uncertainty about the true underlying model.
Therefore, uncertainty quantification for each dataset naturally becomes a necessary part in
computing the expected loss, which is ultimately what this chapter tries to solve.

3.1

BMA and Non-parametric Modeling

Consider the following toy example of comparing two datasets that were generated by the
same 2-dimensional binary classification problem in Figure 3.1, where dataset D1 only contains sample from a specific area of the domain while dataset D2 captures a wider area.
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Samples in one class are marked with a blue + while samples in the other are marked with
a red −. Using a logistic regression model where y = σ(θ0 + θ1 · [x]1 + θ2 · [x]2 ) for σ the
sigmoid function, and using 0.5 as the threshold for classification, Figure 3.1 shows the decision boundaries corresponding to the mean and 50 samples from a Laplace approximation
to the posterior distribution of the weights, with the intercept −(θ0 /θ2 ) set to the mean for
sake of visualization.
Due to the data disagreeing with the structure of a linear model, the posterior distribution
induced by D2 has high variance, and therefore is associated with high uncertainty about
the true decision boundary. However, the posterior distribution induced by D1 is relatively
confident about where the true decision boundary lies. Indeed, when using the respective
posterior distributions for computing the expected loss with the log loss function, assuming
a uniform distribution over the domain X = [−4, 4] × [−4, 4], we have L(D1 ) = 0.1442 while
L(D2 ) = 0.6588. On the other hand, as expected, the actual expected log loss with known
labels over the domain for D1 is very high at L(D1 ) = 5.2133 while L(D2 ) = 0.6209. Here,
the actual expected log loss with known labels was taken as usual:
L(D) = −EX [y log π(x) + (1 − y) log(1 − π(x))]

(3.1.1)

As it can be seen from the above toy example, using the right model in computing the posterior distribution is imperative for using the expected loss in evaluating datasets. However,
knowing a priori which model to use in computing the expected loss is not always feasible. To overcome this, two methods are proposed: Bayesian model averaging (BMA) and
non-parametric models.

3.1.1

Bayesian Model Averaging

BMA is a soft model selection method that factors in uncertainty about the problem’s
structure. Given a set of models M = {M1 , . . . , Mn } with a prior distribution over each
model, it computes the posterior distribution for each model given the data, and uses it
to output a weighted average for each prediction. The posterior distribution P(Mi | D) is
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(a) D1

(b) D2

Figure 3.1: Two datasets with posterior distribution of slope of decision boundary assuming
a linear model
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computed as:
P(Mi | D) =

p(D | Mi )P(Mi )
p(D)

(3.1.2)

where the likelihood of the data given a model is computed by marginalizing the relevant
parameters θ i as:
Z
p(D | Mi ) =
p(y | X, θ i , Mi )p(θ i | Mi )dθ i
(3.1.3)
Θ

and the denominator, or normalizing factor is simply computed as:
p(D) =

n
X

p(D | Mi )P(Mi )

(3.1.4)

i=1

With the posterior computed, the predictive posterior distribution becomes:
p(y | x, D) =

n
X

p(y | x, D, Mi )P(Mi | D)

(3.1.5)

i=1

However, notice that the posterior distribution for each model also depends on the data.
In other words, going back to the toy example, if the model posterior distributions were
computed separately, then D1 would output a linear model to be close to the true model,
and BMA would fail in discovering that a linear model is not to be trusted. Therefore,
with various sellers, it is necessary that the model posterior probabilities are computed with
all the data combined. In other words, if there are datasets D1 , . . . , Dm , model posterior
distributions should be computed as:
P(Mi | D1 , . . . , Dm )

(3.1.6)

for each possible model. Using BMA in computing the expected loss is demonstrated in
Chapter 5 with synthetic data and encryption.
One potential problem for this method is the need for a set of predetermined models and
a prior distribution over them. That said, I believe the need for a prior distribution could
even be an advantage that reflects the buyer’s prior knowledge about the problem, especially
that reflects the buyer’s specific needs. Furthermore, the problem of model selection is not
particular just to this scenario, but for the entire field of machine learning and statistics.
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Finally, I add that when computing the model posterior probabilities in real-life, computing
the integral in (3.1.3) is often intractable, especially for classification problems using a logistic
link function. Therefore, in practice, I use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) as a
surrogate to the model posterior probabilities. The BIC is defined as such:
BIC(Mi ) = log p(D | θ̂MAP ) −

d
log N
2

(3.1.7)

where d denotes the dimensionality of θ and N denotes the number of samples in D. Notice
that the BIC penalizes complex models with many parameters, appealing to Occam’s Razor.

3.1.2

Non-parametric Models

Another solution to the problem of model selection in computing expected loss is to use
non-parametric models that do not assume a predetermined structure in the pattern of the
data. Gaussian process (GP) models are a natural choice as a non-parametric probabilistic
model due to its theoretical guarantees (Neal, 1996) and great interpretability (Rasmussen
and Williams, 2005). Furthermore, GPs exhibit uncertainty in areas of the domain far from
where the data lies. Therefore, using GPs for computing the expected loss favors data
that are relevant to the buyer’s problem. Finally, GPs naturally work as a Bayesian model
that automatically factors in uncertainty about predictions. This proves to be important in
computing the expected loss as it is shown in the next section.
We may see how using GPs perform in the above problem. Using a GP classification model
with the RBF kernel, the logistic link function, and a Laplace approximation to compute
the expected log losses L and the actual log losses L, we have:
L(D1 ) = 0.6296 L(D1 ) = 0.5356
L(D2 ) = 0.5063 L(D2 ) = 0.4048
Indeed, we see that the expected loss is a closer approximation to the actual log loss and
preserves the order of quality between D1 and D2 . Note that this toy experiment was done
without careful hyperparameter tuning to emulate real-life scenarios.
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3.2

Point Estimation and Bayesian Inference

As seen in the previous section, considering model uncertainty is crucial in computing the
expected loss between datasets that may fit each assumed model differently. Now, we look
at a case where two datasets may follow the same model structure, but with different levels
of confidence. This addresses parameter uncertainty in computing the expected loss with
parametric models. Before looking at a demonstration, we may look at how point estimation
and Bayesian inference differ in computing the posterior predictive distributions. An MAP
point estimation simply uses the following:
θ ∗ = arg max p(θ | D) = arg max p(D | θ)p(θ)
θ

(3.2.1)

θ

p(y | x, D) = p(y | x, θ ∗ )

(3.2.2)

whereas a Bayesian treatment uses:
Z
p(y | x, θ)p(θ | D)dθ

p(y | x, D) =

(3.2.3)

Θ

Notice that the point estimate does not consider the variance of the parameters’ posterior
distribution, and therefore the amount of uncertainty that the data induces is ignored. On
the other hand, Bayesian inference, albeit with the use of an often intractable integral,
marginalizes the parameters, fully incorporating its uncertainty.
Consider the following toy example of two datasets of different quality in Figure 3.2 (plotted
similarly to Figure 3.1), where D1 has closely packed clusters of points farther away from
the true latent decision boundary while D2 has wide clusters of points closer to the latent
boundary. Intuitively, D2 is more informative than D1 about where the latent boundary
lies. Indeed, the samples from the Laplace approximation of the Bayesian posterior shows
a lot of uncertainty in where the boundary lies for D1 compared to that for D2 . However,
using a point estimate for the model to compute p(y | x, D) would lead to both datasets
using almost the same parameters, and consequently, lead to similar expected loss. Again,
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computing the expected log loss and actual log loss with a point estimate, we have:
LMAP (D1 ) = 0.2331 LMAP (D1 ) = 0.1814
LMAP (D2 ) = 0.2437 LMAP (D2 ) = 0.1440
Notice that the expected loss is almost equal to each other where as the actual loss favors
D2 . Using a Laplace approximation to the Bayesian posterior to incorporate parameter
uncertainty, we have:
L(D1 ) = 0.4453 L(D1 ) = 0.3963
L(D2 ) = 0.1751 L(D2 ) = 0.1525
which successfully incorporates parameter uncertainty in measuring and differentiating the
quality of the two datasets.
This phenomenon of parameter uncertainty affecting dataset quality will be much more
significant in real-life higher dimensional data due to the curse of dimensionality. Therefore,
despite the computational challenges in incorporating Bayesian inference, especially over an
encrypted domain which will be discussed in the next chapter, using Bayesian inference for
parameter uncertainty quantification is necessary in computing expected loss.
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(a) D1

(b) D2

Figure 3.2: Two datasets with posterior distribution of slope of decision boundary assuming
a linear model
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Chapter 4
Homomorphic Encryption
As we assume to work under a semi-honest protocol, we are presented the challenge of
computing the expected loss without compromising the data. With an untrusted 3rd party
(U3P) computing the expected loss on behalf of the buyer and the seller, I propose using
homomorphic encryption (HE) for encrypting both the buyer and seller’s data and computing
the expected loss under encryption. In this chapter, I will first briefly explain HE and the
implementation I chose to use along with how logistic regression is performed. Then, despite
the argument made in section 3.4, I show why Bayesian inference is infeasible with HE,
and propose bootstrapping for approximate Bayesian inference. Finally, putting everything
together, I outline the full pipeline of dataset evaluation that may be applied to a real-life
data market.

4.1

HE for Arithmetic of Approximate Numbers (HEAAN)

HE is a cryptographic scheme that allows homomorphic operations on encrypted data to
be preserved after decryption (Rivest, 1978). This allows for untrusted parties to be able
to process the encrypted data without the decryption key. In relation to our problem, this
allows the U3P to compute the expected loss on encrypted data without ever accessing the
decrypted data itself. Using the notation used by Gentry (2009) in the introduction of Fully
HE (FHE), a public key HE scheme E has four algorithms: KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, and
Evaluate. KeyGen is the usual algorithm that generates a public key pk and private key sk
where the public key is used by Encrypt for encrypting data (or plaintext) into encrypted data
(or ciphertext) and the private key is used by Decrypt for decrypting ciphertext into plaintext.
21

Evaluate is the algorithm of interest, where once provided a public key (or evaluation key
evk as we will later see), a circuit of operations, and a tuple of ciphertexts, performs the
circuit on the ciphertexts to output an encrypted version of the output whose corresponding
decrypted plaintext should equal to the output if the circuit were performed on the original
plaintexts themselves. The following shows a brief pseudocode illustrating the process:
Algorithm 4.1 Homomorphic Public Key Encryption Scheme
Input: plaintext tuple π = (π1 , . . . , πn ), circuit C, secruity parameter λ
Output: output π = C(π)
(sk, pk) ← KeyGen(λ)
(ψ1 , . . . , ψn ) =: Ψ ← Encrypt(pk, π)
ψ ← Evaluate(pk, C, Ψ)
π ← Decrypt(sk, ψ)
return π

Note that a scheme E is a HE scheme if the ciphertext size and decryption time is polynomial
in λ. A FHE, as introduced by Gentry (2009), is a scheme that is homomorphic for all circuits.
While many FHE schemes exist, I chose to use the HEAAN scheme by Cheon et al. (2016)
that performs efficient approximate computation over complex numbers, allowing for dealing
with real-valued continuous data. In this section, I will briefly introduce the ring learning
with errors (RLWE) problem, on which the HEAAN scheme, along with many other FHE
schemes, is based on, and then the HEAAN scheme itself.

4.1.1

RLWE Problem

The RLWE problem, introduced by Lyubashevsky et al. (2013), extends the learning with
errors (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev (2005). While Regev first introduced the search
version of the problem, we present the decision version which is more relevant to this work.
The decision LWE problem is as follows:
Definition 4.1.1 (Learning with Errors Decision Problem). Let secret s ∈ Znq with size
n ≥ 1, modulus q ≥ 2. Let χ on Zq be the probability distribution of the error e. Then,
let As,χ on Znq × Zq be the probability distribution of (a, ⟨a, s⟩ + e mod q) from sampling
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a ∼ Uniform(Znq ) and e ∼ χ. The LWE decision problem is to distinguish between samples
from As,χ and uniformly random samples from Znq × Zq .
Notice that this problem would be easy to solve if it were not for the e ∼ χ term that
introduces the “error” to the linear equations.
The RLWE problem substitutes Znq with the ring Rq := Zq [x]/Φn (x), where Φn (x) is the
nth cyclotomic polynomial, switching from working with vectors to polynomials. Note that
for n = 2h , we simply have Φn (x) = xn/2 + 1. Furthermore, notice that the transition from
vectors to polynomials is natural once we consider representing each polynomial in terms of
its coefficients. The RLWE problem as used in Cheon et al. (2016) in their description of the
HEAAN scheme follows this definition, using a discretized rounded Gaussian distribution for
χ. Formally written, we have the following definition:
Definition 4.1.2 (Ring Learning with Errors Decision Problem). Let secret s ∈ Rq and
χ be the error distribution. Then, let As,χ on Rq × Rq be the probability distribution of
(a, ⟨a, s⟩ + e) from sampling a ∼ Uniform(Rq ) and e ∼ χ. The RLWE decision problem is
to distinguish between samples from As,χ and uniformly random samples from Rq × Rq .
The hardness of this problem is discussed in detail by Lyubashevsky et al. (2013), where they
show the equivalence of the decision problem with the search problem, and prove a quantum
reduction from the worst-case shortest vector problem on ideal lattices in R := Z[x]/Φn (x)
to the search problem. Regev (2010) also discusses the advantages that RLWE has over
LWE, especially in cryptography, with regards to size and speed.

4.1.2

HEAAN Scheme

The philosophy behind HEAAN is that the encryption noise should be ignored as an error
occuring in approximate computation, similarly to how observation noise, which occurs when
data are often not a perfect representation of the true values, and finite precision arithmetic
in computers, which is a result of representing real numbers with a finite number of bits,
are treated. This is where the connection to the RLWE problem lies: the e ∼ χ in RLWE
problems that ensures its hardness is treated as an encryption noise and kept small such
that it does not significantly perturb the original data.
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In fact, HEAAN’s novelty compared to other FHE schemes is motivated by the idea of how
numbers are stored with a finite number of bits. The challenge in past FHE schemes was
identifying the least significant bits (LSBs) so that they may be removed in a rounding
process, especially in computing multiplication. This challenge was caused by the fact that
the “rounding” of a high degree polynomial cannot be easily represented as a lower degree
polynomial. To bypass this problem, HEAAN uses a rescaling technique that manipulates
the ciphertexts by rescaling them as such:
c′ ← ⌊p−1 · c⌉ mod q/p

(4.1.1)

where ⟨c, sk⟩ = m + e mod q for c the ciphertext, sk the private key, m the plaintext, e the
encryption noise, and p a rescaling factor, such that c′ becomes an encryption of m/p with
noise e/p both mod q/p . Doing so for c1 , c2 when multiplying the two reduces the size
of the ciphertext modulus q → q/p, mimicking fixed floating-point arithmetic for reasonable
precision and outstanding efficiency. The technical implementation of how rescaling is done
with an additional “evaluation key” is described in depth in Cheon et al. (2016).
This allows HEAAN to efficiently implement the operations Add(c1 , c2 ) and Mulitply(c1 , c2 )
for evaluating circuits in ciphertext while maintaining reasonable accuracy, even when working with continuous real numbers. Then, this allows us to perform any polynomial operations
on the data. Again, Cheon et al. (2016) go in depth on how HEAAN implements polynomials, along with approximate polynomials, multiplicative inverses, and fast Fourier transforms.
For the purposes of this work, I will focus on polynomials.

4.2

Logistic Regression with HE

Unfortunately, the fact that HEAAN only allows for polynomials is limiting. When computing expected loss, this becomes a problem once we are compelled to compute p(y | x, D).
Logistic regression, for example, requires evaluation of a sigmoid function σ which is not a
polynomial of finite degree:
σ(z) =

1
1 + e−z

σ ′ (z) = σ(z)(1 − σ(z))
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(4.2.1)

Figure 4.1: Approximations of the Sigmoid Function
On the other hand, apart from the sigmoid function and its derivative, using logistic regression and samples of the domain distribution x ∼ X to compute the expected loss with a
polynomial loss function may be done all with ciphertext until we decrypt the final output to
get a plaintext version of the expected loss (the challenge of using Bayesian logistic regression
discussed in section 3.4 will be addressed in section 4.3).
While Cheon et al. (2016) mention using a Taylor approximation to the sigmoid function,
later works including Kim et al. (2018) and Han et al. (2019) propose using a least squares
approximation over the interval z ∈ [−8, 8]. Indeed, a Taylor approximation of degree 9 has
a rapidly increasing error from |z| > 2, while a least squares approximation of just degree
3 maintains reasonable errors as shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. The polynomials are
numerically:
1 1
1
1 5
17 7
31
+ z − z3 +
z −
z +
z9
2 4
48
480
80640
1451520
g3 (z) ≈ 0.5 + 0.1501z − 0.001593z 3

T9 (z) =

g7 (z) ≈ 0.5 + 0.2169z − 0.008191z 3 + 0.0001658z 5 − 0.000001196z 7
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Figure 4.2: Approximations of the Derivative of the Sigmoid Function
where T9 is the degree 9 Taylor approximation and gd is the least squares approximation of
degree d.
Using gd polynomial approximations, we are able to evaluate the sigmoid function and actually perform gradient descent in ciphertext to approximate p(y | x, D) with reasonable
performance. A detailed explanation of the implementation of logistic regression under HE
that I used is described in Kim et al. (2018).
To verify that this polynomial approximation is reasonable in the context of logistic regression, I show how it performs both under encryption and without encryption. The following
results in Table 4.1 report the accuracy, log loss, and the area under the receiver operating
characteristic curve (AUC) score for the MNIST dataset for digits 3 and 8 with HEAAN and
g3 , g7 along with the results for a non-encrypted logistic regression model, where one uses the
original sigmoid function and the others each use g3 , g7 . For all models, I use 42 iterations
with a learning rate of 1.0, and a mini-batch of 1024 for each gradient descent step. I use
a compressed version of the MNIST dataset, which is originally a 28 × 28 pixel image, into
a 14 × 14 pixel image by taking the mean value of each 2 × 2 pixel square. The dataset
has 11, 982 training samples and 1, 984 testing samples. I ran the experiment 10 times and
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Encryption

Encrypted

Link

g3

g7

Unencrypted
σ

g3

g7

Accuracy

0.9622

0.9602 0.9545

0.9630

0.9579

log loss

0.5124

0.5046 0.5012

0.5107

0.5085

0.991

0.991

AUC

0.992

0.991

0.990

Table 4.1: Performance Comparison on MNIST

report only the mean. Notice that the experiments show that the g3 and g7 polynomials are
reasonable estimates for σ in the context of logistic regression. Furthermore, we see that
encryption does not significantly change the results of the optimization process. The log
loss is moderately high across all models for a binary classification problem, a result of only
making 42 steps of gradient descent.

4.3

Bootstrapping for Approximate Bayesian Inference

As demonstrated in section 3.4, a point estimate of the weight vector in using logistic regression for estimating p(y | x, D) cannot entirely capture the value of a dataset. A point
estimate cannot represent the posterior variance of the weight vector given the dataset, possibly estimating two datasets of different value to be similar. Uncertainty quantification is
crucial in computing expected loss as expected loss, for certain loss functions, itself may be
seen as a measure of uncertainty given the data.
Nonparametric probabilistic models such as GPs could be considered, but they involve computing the covariance matrix, taking the inverse of the covariance matrix of size n × n, where
n is the number of samples in D, and an approximation method for the posterior. While
Lu et al. (2017) and Hall et al. (2011) discuss iterative methods for matrix inversion under
FHE for the purposes of linear regression, the above three operations in GP classification
present a computational bottleneck for a reasonable implementation under HEAAN.
The computational bottleneck of matrix inversion presents a challenge for using the Laplace
approximation for Bayesian logistic regression as well. Furthermore, even with a Laplace
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approximation on the weight vector, computing the Gaussian cumulative density function
(CDF) under FHE for p(y | x, D) remains a challenge as well. Using Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods for approximate Bayesian inference is also infeasible due to most
methods using computationally heavy operations or infeasible ones such as inequality operations in Metropolis-Hastings.
However, using Monte Carlo (MC) samples provides an inspiration for how to proceed with
approximate Bayesian inference in our problem. Bootstrapping samples of D to compute
samples of the posterior weight distribution p(w | D) and then using them for approximate
Bayesian inference of p(y | x, D) is a viable option due to its simplicity and ease of parallel
implementation.
For a reasonable approximation to the true posterior, I use three bootstrapping methods in
conjunction. The first is the weighted likelihood bootstrap (WLB), or as further developed,
the weighted Bayesian bootstrap (WBB). WLB was first introduced by Newton and Rafferty
(1993) and was developed into WBB by Newton et al. (2021). Notice that, assuming a
Gaussian prior on w, finding the MAP of the weights in logistic regression is simply an
optimization problem as such:
∗

w = arg min L(w) = arg min
w

n
X

w

ℓe (yi , σ(w⊤ xi )) + λ||w||2

(4.3.1)

i=1

Newton et al. (2021) uses this problem formulation by simply reweighting each data point
with random samples from an Exponential distribution. The resulting algorithm is given as
such:
Algorithm 4.2 Weighted Bayesian Bootstrap for Logistic Regression
Input: data D = {xi , yi }ni=1 , number of weight samples T
Output: weight samples from approximate posterior {wt }Tt=1
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Sample (u0 , . . . , un ) ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
θi ← log(1/ui ) for i = 0, . . . , n
Pn
⊤
2
wt ← arg minw
i=1 θi ℓe (yi , σ(w xi )) + θ0 λ||w||
return (w1 , . . . , wT )
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Despite being a simple algorithm, the WBB converges asymptotically to a Gaussian approximate of the posterior, effectively returning samples from a Laplace approximation of the
posterior. Details of this convergence analysis can be seen in Newton and Rafferty (1993)
and Newton et al. (2021). The second bootstrapping method I use is bootstrapping with
noise, appealing to Raviv and Intrator (1996), but with a simpler implementation. With
a small percentage ϵ ∈ (0, 1), I flip the labels yi for each bootstrapped sample to force the
optimization loop to output a weight vector that is not too close to the MAP. After various
experiments, I found ϵ = 0.01 to work best, but this may vary for each situation. Finally,
I also use the m out of n bootstrap, appealing to Cheung et al. (2005). I found that using
between n2/3 to n3/4 samples for each bootstrapped sample works best.

4.4

Data Evaluation Pipeline

Using logistic regression over HEAAN with bootstrapping for approximate Bayesian inference, we are ready to finalize the secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol with
which datasets may be evaluated in a market setting. We have three parties: the buyer,
the seller, and the U3P. In this section, we denote the encrypted version of any data or
number with ′ unless noted otherwise. First of all, the buyer generates a public key pk,
a private key sk, and an evaluation key evk, sharing the public key to the seller and the
evaluation key to the U3P. The key generation service may be provided by the U3P, but
parameterized by the buyer’s own secure passcode so that the U3P cannot reverse engineer
the keys. Then, if the buyer has their own dataset Db they would like to improve, they
encrypt it to Db′ = Encrypt(pk, Db ) and send it to the U3P who computes the encrypted
expected loss L′ (Db ) = Evaluate(evk, L, Db′ ). Then, the seller encrypts their dataset Ds into
Ds′ = Encrypt(pk, Ds ) which is sent to the U3P. Next, the U3P computes the encrypted
expected loss of Db ∪ Ds , denoted L′ (Db ∪ Ds ) = Evaluate(evk, L, Db′ ∪ Ds′ ). Finally, the U3P
sends L′ (Db ) and L′ (Db ∪ Ds ) to the buyer, who then decrypts the values for evaluation:
L(Db ) = Decrypt(sk, L′ (Db )), L(Db ∪ Ds ) = Decrypt(sk, L′ (Db ∪ Ds )). This protocol is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Note that the Evaluate(evk, L, Db′ ∪ Ds′ ) operation involves the steps
discussed in chapters 3 and 4, namely Bayesian model averaging (BMA) and bootstrapping
for approximate Bayesian inference. For computing the BIC for BMA under encryption, I
again use a least-squares approximation of degree 3 over [0, 1] for the log function.
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Figure 4.3: Secure MPC Protocol for Computing Expected Loss
Notice that the U3P only works with encrypted data, without any access to the public
key nor the private key, preventing from any of the data being compromised. While the
U3P has access to the evaluation key, which is essential for computing multiplication under
HEAAN, the hardness of the RLWE problem prevents the U3P from being able to solve the
private key. Furthermore, the buyer is only given the encrypted expected losses without ever
accessing the seller’s data directly, which is exactly what we want in this scenario. Finally,
since the seller only really provides their data without anything in return, they cannot infer
anything. Notice that both the buyer and the seller cannot exploit this protocol by carefully
manipulating their datasets, preventing this pipeline being susceptible to adversarial buyers
and sellers too. Therefore, we see that the given MPC protocol is secure under a semi-honest
actors assumption.
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Chapter 5
Experiments
In this chapter, I demonstrate several experiments that use the full MPC protocol outlined
in Chapter 4. First, I perform experiments on synthetic data, primarily focusing on showing
the effects of BMA and bootstrapping for approximate Bayesian inference. Second, I use
a real-life medical diagnostic dataset, dividing it into numerous datasets according to the
distance to the maximal-margin hyperplane. For the second experiment, I implement a
customized loss function and describe what decision a buyer would make according to the
results.
For all experiments, I report the expected loss L, the actual loss L, and real time spent. I
use 100 bootstrap runs to approximate Bayesian inference. Furthermore, to emulate real life
situations, instead of explicitly defining a distribution over the domain with which to take
the expectation, I use a test dataset to serve as a MC approximation to the expected value.
In HEAAN, I use g3 , the 3rd degree polynomial least-squares approximation to the sigmoid
function. For all experiments, I use 6 cores (12 threads) of Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU @ 2.30Hz
with 32GB of memory.

5.1

Synthetic Data with Different Patterns

For the synthetic dataset for x = (x1 , x2 , x3 ) ∈ R3 , the underlying function that decides the
label is:
y = 1[x21 + x22 + x23 + ε < 32 ]
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where ε ∼ N (0, 0.12 ), making the underlying boundary the surface of a 3-dimensional sphere
with radius 3 centered at 0 with small error. Then, the following datasets Di were generated:
D1 : 50 points with x1 ∼ N (1, 0.52 ); x2 , x3 ∼ N (0, 0.52 ), 50 points with x1 ∼ N (5, 0.52 ); x2 , x3 ∼
N (0, 0.52 )
D2 : 100 points with x1 ∼ N (3, 12 ); x2 , x3 ∼ N (0, 12 )
D3 : 100 points with x1 , x2 , x3 ∼ N (0, 22 )
D4 : 100 points uniformly distributed over the surface x21 + x22 + x23 = 3 with each term
perturbed by δ ∼ N (0, 0.12 )
Notice both D1 and D2 have points from a specific part of the domain such that the data
cannot capture the entire sphere shape of the true boundary. On the other hand, D3 and
D4 are distributed well enough such that the data captures the sphere shape, but D3 has
points throughout the domain while D4 has points closely packed around the boundary. The
expected order of quality is: D4 > D3 > D2 > D1 .
The test dataset Dt which will serve as a sample of the test distribution, is 1000 points with
x1 ∼ N (−3, 12 ), x2 ∼ N (1, 12 ), x3 ∼ N (0, 32 ). Furthermore, for this problem, I assume the
buyer has no prior dataset. Finally, I use the square-root of the ℓ2 loss function, with the
square-root taken so that the loss is in the same units as the probability.
For BMA, we use the following models with an uninformative prior that places equal probability to each model. Since all models are generalized linear models (GLM) with the logistic link function, I identify each model Mj by the corresponding feature transformation
ϕj : R3 → Rdj :
ϕ1 (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = [x1 , x2 , x3 ]⊤
ϕ2 (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = [x21 , x22 , x23 ]⊤
ϕ3 (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = [xi xj for i, j = 1, 2, 3]⊤
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D1

D2

D3

D4

Expected Loss

0.2091

0.1697

0.1479

0.1104

Actual Loss

0.2154

0.1527

0.1150

0.1178

752 mins

749 mins

750 mins

753 mins

Time

Table 5.1: Synthetic Dataset

S
First, running BMA with D = i Di with encryption, using the BIC as an approximation
for the posterior probabilities, we have:
P(ϕ1 | D) = 0.0001 P(ϕ2 | D) = 0.9989 P(ϕ3 | D) = 0.0010
Notice that the model ϕ2 , which is what the true boundary uses, has the highest model
posterior probability by a large margin due to having a reasonable model likelihood with a
few number of parameters. Due to the large gap between the posterior probabilities, I resort
to use Bayesian model selection instead, choosing ϕ2 . Then, using these results, we get the
following results in Table 5.1 for each dataset. The time reported excludes the time used for
executing BMA.
Here, we see that the order of both expected loss and actual loss follow the expected order
of quality, except for the actual loss for D3 being lower than that for D4 by a small amount.
However, we also see that even for a small dataset of low dimensionality, the process of
bootstrapping and computing under encryption leads to the computation time being very
long.

5.2

Medical Diagnostic Data with Variable Loss Function

For a real life dataset, I use the Breast Cancer dataset that classifies breast cancer cells
according to whether they are malignant (1) or benign (0) (Zwitter and Soklic, 1992). For
fast implementation, using the knowledge that a linear model fits the data well, I do not
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Db

Db ∪ D1

Db ∪ D2

Db ∪ D3

Db ∪ D4

Expected Loss

29978.25

10766.92

15982.82

19945.82

19979.60

Actual Loss

28653.56

12260.91

16200.54

17278.23

18723.13

Time

570 mins

910 mins

912 mins

911 mins

910 mins

Table 5.2: Breast Cancer Dataset

perform BMA and simply use a GLM with the logistic link function for evaluating the
posterior predictive distribution. I add that this will likely be the case for many real-life
situations involving tabular data.
Using a dataset of a total of 569 samples, 149 samples were randomly chosen as the test
dataset that will serve as a MC approximation to the domain distribution. Then, the sellers’
datasets and the buyer’s dataset were built as such. First, a support-vector machine (SVM)
model is fitted to the entire data. Then, the points excluding the points in the test dataset
are sorted in increasing order according to their distance to the maximal margin hyperplane
found by the SVM. Then, the closest points in each target class are added in order to the
following datasets: 100 to D1 , 100 to D2 , 100 to D3 , 20 to Db , and the last 100 to D4 ,
where Db corresponds to the buyer’s dataset. Note that the expected order of quality is
D1 > D2 > D3 > D4 . Furthermore, we expect D4 to not significantly reduce the expected
loss once augmented onto Db . This entire process is done such that the label ratio of the
entire dataset (357 : 212) is preserved as much as possible for each dataset.
For this problem, I use a special loss function that heavily penalizes type II errors compared
to type I errors, and also factors in the monetary cost for each error. The custom loss
function is given as such:
ℓ(y = 1, π(x)) = 100000 · π(x)
ℓ(y = 0, π(x)) = 20000 · (1 − π(x))
Then, we have the following results in Table 5.2.
Notice again that the order of quality according to expected loss and actual loss both follow
the expected order of quality. Furthermore, we are able to see that all datasets provide a
34

meaningful decrease in loss once augmented onto the buyer’s dataset. Finally, we are able to
make a reasoned decision to buy D1 as long as the price is at most the expected decrease in
loss, which is 19211.33. The actual marginal gain comes out to be 16392.65, which is lower
than the expected decrease in loss and therefore the willingness to pay, but such errors are
cannot be fully prevented.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The expected loss corresponding to the posterior predictive distribution induced by a dataset
is a flexible and theoretically sound method of estimating the value of that dataset. When
using common loss functions, we are able to relate the expected loss to either the posterior
variance of hypotheses or the information gain of the dataset. Furthermore, the definition
allows for flexible configurations of the loss function that fits particular situations. However,
computing it requires careful consideration of uncertainty, which can be addressed by using
Bayesian inference with Bayesian model averaging (BMA) or non-parametric models. In
real-life implementations, homomorphic encryption is a promising encryption method that
allows for computing the expected loss without the judged data being compromised. Seeing
this in action with synthetic and real-life data, we are able to see reasonable results that
correctly determine the qualities of datasets, albeit with some error which is to be expected.
While a promising idea and possibly an opportunity for a new industry to bloom, there are
two limitations in this proposed idea, both related to homomorphic encryption (HE). The
first limitation is the lack of complicated operations feasible with HE. While the logistic function was approximated, the limit to polynomial functions greatly hinders various interesting
loss functions from being used in this framework. This is also why Chapter 5 had to resort to
simple polynomial loss functions, instead of a more commonly used classification loss function such as the log loss function. Another method that is not feasible due to limitations in
the type of computation that HE allows is Gaussian process (GP) models. As mentioned in
section 4.3, the inversion of the Gram matrix is not feasible for moderately sized datasets
as current matrix inversion implementations under HE rely on iterative methods (Hall et
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al., 2011). In general, more approximate matrix operations being implemented with great
precision is required for the use of non-parametric methods and interesting loss functions.
The second, and perhaps the more important limitation is the time spent on computing the
expected loss. Without HE, each experiment in Chapter 5 takes less than 10 seconds to
run, whereas using HE leads to evaluating one dataset to take over 12 hours for very small
datasets. This is why this work is limited to datasets of small sample size and dimensionality.
For this work to be feasible, much faster schemes in HE must be implemented so that datasets
may be evaluated promptly. This would also allow room for using more complicated models,
such as neural networks.
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